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Recent media coverage on the problems in the subprime mortgage market has featured an alphabet 
soup of abbreviations, such as MBS, CDO, and SIV. What do these terms stand for? And how do 
they ﬁ  t into the mortgage ﬁ  nancing process?
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The process by which 
most mortgage loans are 
sold to investors is referred 
to as securitization.
In this Chicago Fed Letter, I discuss the 
sources of ﬁ  nancing for mortgages. My 
focus is on the role of securitization in 
ﬁ  nancing mortgages, which includes 
mortgage-backed securities (MBSs), 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), 
and structured investment vehicles (SIVs). 
I ﬁ  rst outline the process by which a mort-
gage becomes part of an MBS, touching 
on the role of Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, 
and Freddie Mac (secondary market 
lenders, described in detail later). I then 
explain how MBSs are repackaged into 
CDOs and SIVs. 
Mortgage origination and securitization
Thirty years ago, if you got a mortgage 
from a bank, it was very likely that the 
bank would keep the loan on its balance 
sheet until the loan was repaid. That is 
no longer true. Today, the party that 
you deal with in order to get the loan 
(the originator) is highly likely to sell 
the loan to a third party (see ﬁ  gure 1). 
The third party can be Ginnie Mae, a 
government agency; Fannie Mae or 
Freddie Mac, which are government-
sponsored entities (GSEs); or a private 
sector ﬁ  nancial institution. The third 
party often then packages your mortgage 
with others and sells the payment rights 
to investors. This may not be the ﬁ  nal 
stop for your mortgage. Some of the 
investors may use their payment rights 
to your mortgage to back other securities 
they issue. This can continue for additional 
steps. In effect, the eventual buyers of 
the mortgage—the parties that provide 
the funding—can be many steps removed 
from the originator of the mortgage.
The process by which most mortgage 
loans are sold to investors is referred 
to as securitization. In the mortgage 
market, securitization converts mort-
gages to mortgage-backed securities.1 
An MBS is a bond whose payments are 
based on the payments of a collection 
of individual mortgages. The initial sales 
of the bonds are put together either by 
the two GSEs or by private ﬁ  nancial in-
stitutions, such as Countrywide Financial, 
Lehman Brothers, or Wells Fargo (all 
among the top six private issuers in 
2006).2 The MBS origination process 
typically begins when the issuer purchases 
a collection of mortgages from the orig-
inators. As payments are made on the 
mortgages, they are passed through the 
trust to bondholders.
As an example of an MBS issuance, 
assume that an issuer has collected 
1,000 mortgages, each worth $100,000 
with a 30-year maturity and a ﬁ  xed in-
terest rate of 6.50%. This $100 million 
pool of mortgages can be used to back 
10,000 bonds, each worth $10,000 with 
a 30-year term and a ﬁ  xed coupon rate 
of 6.00%. Each bond shares the same 
coupon rate and other features, and 
importantly, each has a similar claim on 
all payments. The MBSs are structured 
so that interest payments on the mort-
gages are at least sufﬁ  cient to cover the 2.  MBS share of total mortgage debt outstanding









interest payments due on the bonds 
(plus the fees of the intermediaries). 
Principal payments (either scheduled 
payments or prepayments) on the 
mortgages are used to pay down the 
principal on the bonds.
Since investors can invest in MBSs directly 
or indirectly (e.g., through mutual 
funds), these asset-backed securities 
allow a broad investor base to help 
fund home mortgages. In part for this 
reason, an increasing share of home 
mortgages have been securitized, with 
the ratio of MBSs to total mortgages now 
over 50% (see ﬁ  gure 2). 
Participants in securitization
In addition to private ﬁ  rms, the partic-
ipants in the mortgage securitization pro-
cess are the government agency Ginnie 
Mae and the government-sponsored 
entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
Ginnie Mae facilitates the securitization 
of home mortgages backed by federally 
insured or guaranteed loans, such as 
those issued by the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) or the U.S. 
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). 
Ginnie Mae guarantees the timely pay-
ment of mortgages’ principal and inter-
est, thereby reducing the risks for MBS 
investors. That said, it guaranteed the 
mortgages underlying only 4% of all 
MBSs issued in 2006.
The GSEs Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
accounted for a more substantial 40% 
of MBSs issued in 2006. They purchase 
what are known as conforming mort-
gages from originators. Conforming 
mortgages are those that meet certain 
borrower quality characteristics and loan-
to-value ratios and are smaller than the 
conforming loan size limit ($417,000 as 
of January 1, 2007). These GSEs use 
these conforming loans to back the MBSs 
they issue, adding guarantees that prin-
cipal and interest on the mortgages 
will be paid.3 
The remaining 56% of MBSs issued in 
2006 were packaged by private sector 
ﬁ  nancial institutions. Most of these MBSs 
included securities backed by high-
quality (prime) loans, subprime loans, 
or “Alt-A” loans. The problems with 
mortgages in recent 
months have been 
largely conﬁ  ned to the 
subprime and Alt-A 
sectors, and it is the 
MBSs backed by pools 
of these loans that have 
had the most problems.
The difference between 
prime and subprime 
mortgage loans hinges 
on borrower quality. 
A prime loan indicates 
that the borrower has 
a good credit rating (an 
“A” grade), while the 
subprime borrower has 
a lower credit rating. 
Many of the prime 
loans that back private sector MBSs are 
jumbo loans; such loans are issued to 
high-quality borrowers, but they are too 
large to meet the conforming loan size 
limit of the two GSEs.
Alt-A loans are issued to borrowers that 
appear to have good credit, but these 
loans do not meet the deﬁ  nition of prime 
or conforming. Often, Alt-A loans are 
issued to borrowers with limited or no 
income and asset veriﬁ  cation. In recent 
years, the Alt-A sector has increasingly 
included loans for which the loan-to-
value ratio was too high.
The share of MBSs backed by subprime 
and Alt-A mortgage loans increased 
rapidly in the last decade. From 1996 
through 2006, the share of subprime 
and Alt-A MBSs rose from 47% to 71% 
of total private sector MBS issuances.
The structure of securitizations
The illustrative example of a securitization 
backed by mortgages given previously 
has a much simpler structure than the 
typical securitization issued by a private 
sector ﬁ  rm. The basic pass-through nature 
of most MBSs is the same: Interest pay-
ments on the underlying mortgages are 
used to pay interest on the bonds, and 
principal payments are passed through 
to pay down the principal on the bonds. 
However, the structure of a typical issue 
is much more complicated. In part, the 
complications are there to more ﬁ  nely 
allocate the risks of the underlying 
mortgages to investors.
1. Mortgage funding process
















NOTE: MBS means mortgage-backed security.
SOURCE: Inside Mortgage Finance Publications Inc., 2007, The 2007 Mortgage Market 
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Bond class  Percent of total pool  Rating
 A  94.15  AAA
 B1  2.00  AA
 B2  1.50  A
 B3  1.00  BBB
 B4  0.65  BB
 B5  0.40  B
 B6  0.30  Not  rated 
SOURCE: Mark Adelson, 2006, “MBS basics,”  Nomura Fixed Income Research, March 31.
There are three major risks to MBS 
investors. The ﬁ  rst is interest rate risk, 
and it is common to all bondholders. 
If interest rates change, the value of a 
bond changes in the opposite direction. 
The second risk is prepayment risk. 
Many mortgages in the United States 
can be prepaid without penalty. Pre-
payments introduce timing risk, since 
investors do not know when their bonds 
will be repaid (thereby eliminating future 
interest payments). Additionally, pre-
payments are generally larger when inves-
tors want them to be smaller. That is, 
when the interest rates on new mort-
gages fall, investors like the fact that they 
continue to receive the old, higher in-
terest rates on existing MBSs. But this is 
precisely when borrowers are most likely 
to prepay loans by reﬁ  nancing their 
mortgages. Interest rate risk and pre-
payment risk are common to all MBSs.
The third risk faced by MBS investors is 
default risk—that is, the risk that home-
owners will default on the mortgages 
that back the MBS. As noted earlier, 
Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, and Freddie 
Mac offer guarantees against default risk. 
Private sector MBS issuers may obtain 
direct insurance against default, but often 
they structure their MBSs to allocate de-
fault risk toward parties willing to bear it. 
Among the tools used to distribute de-
fault and payment timing risk are sub-
ordination, overcollateralization, and 
excess spread. Subordination refers to 
a securitization that issues multiple classes 
of bonds that differ in bankruptcy priority. 
Some bonds are senior, while others 
are subordinated. Senior bonds have 
priority in bankruptcy, meaning that as 
mortgages default, the ﬁ  rst losses are 
taken by the subordinated classes. For 
example, some MBSs 
backed by jumbo 
loans use a “six-pack” 
structure, with six 
layers of subordina-
tion (see ﬁ  gure 3).4
The ﬁ  rst default 
losses are allocated 
to the most junior 
class of bond (B6 in 
the example in ﬁ  g-
ure 3) until that class 
is exhausted; then 
losses move up the line. The A class does 
not suffer from default losses until all 
the B classes are completely written down. 
Because of this, ratings are higher for the 
more senior classes. Early prepayments 
are allocated to the A class (to keep the 
other classes around as loss buffers). 
Of the MBSs issued by private ﬁ  rms in 
2006, 93% had subordination (accord-
ing to the Inside Mortgage Finance 
MBS Database).
The MBS issuers also use overcollateral-
ization and excess spread to provide a de-
fault buffer. Overcollateralization refers 
to the difference between the principal 
balance on the loans in the pool and the 
principal balance on the outstanding 
MBSs; excess spread is the difference 
between the interest payments coming 
in (loan payments minus servicing fees) 
and the weighted average payments going 
to bondholders. They are related in 
that excess spread can be used to build 
up overcollateralization. The ﬁ  rst use of 
excess spread is to cover default losses. 
If any excess spread is left, it can be used 
to build up a cushion against future 
losses (e.g., one way to do this is to pay 
down the principal on senior bonds). 
Excess spread varies by deal, but it aver-
aged 2.5% for subprime MBSs in 2006 
(according to Bear Stearns). Overall, 
61% of MBSs issued by private ﬁ  rms in 
2006 were overcollateralized (according 
to the Inside Mortgage Finance MBS 
Database). Traditionally, subordination 
is more common in prime (jumbo) 
MBSs, while subprime and Alt-A MBSs 
are more often structured to include 
signiﬁ  cant excess spread.
The MBSs can be structured also to allo-
cate the timing of payments. An MBS 
can include multiple classes of bonds 
that differ in the order in which they 
are repaid (these classes are typically 
referred to as “tranches”). For example, 
all principal payments could be allocated 
to the A bonds until those are completely 
repaid. Then, principal payments would 
start being allocated to the B bonds. The 
MBSs broken up in this fashion are called 
collateralized mortgage obligations.
Resecuritization
Mortgage-backed securities are not the 
end of the line. Pools of MBSs are 
sometimes collected and securitized. 
Bonds that are themselves backed by 
pools of bonds are referred to as col-
lateralized debt obligations. The CDOs 
can look like MBSs, except that the assets 
are bonds or other assets.5 In recent 
years, a number of CDOs have purchased 
MBSs and the securities of other CDOs. 
The issuers of CDOs were the major 
buyers of the low-rated classes (similar 
to the B classes in the previous exam-
ple) of subprime MBSs in 2006.6 Many 
recently issued CDOs contained mort-
gage securities (e.g., 81% of those issued 
in 2005 did).7 
Structured investment vehicles are sim-
ilar to CDOs. The difference between 
SIVs and CDOs is essentially in the type 
3.  Sample six-pack structure for jumbo mortgage-backed securityof debt they issue. The SIVs are struc-
tures backed by pools of assets, such as 
MBSs and CDO bonds. The SIVs issue 
short- and medium-term debt rather 
than the longer-term debt of most CDOs. 
The short-term debt is referred to as 
asset-backed commercial paper.8
Conclusion
When subprime mortgages started to ex-
perience problems, a variety of organiza-
tions that supported or owned CDOs and 
SIVs began to suffer losses. A number of 
hedge funds and banks (including many 
non-U.S. banks) reported losses related 
to investments in U.S. subprime mortgage 
loans or subprime-loan-based securities. 
As a result, news reports began to feature 
terms such as MBS, CDO, and SIV. This 
article demystiﬁ  es these terms by explain-
ing what the abbreviations stand for and 
how these ﬁ  nancial instruments work.
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